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CRITICAL ESSAYS
Proposed Amendments to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and the
Act of State Doctrine
MANUEL R. ANGULO*
ADRIEN K. WING**
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 3, 1985, United States Senator Charles Mathias (R-Md.) in-
troduced Senate bill 1071 to amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) of 1976.' These amendments are based on proposals adopted
* B.A. Yale, J.D. Harvard Law School, Member of the Bar of the State of New York,
Partner, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
** A.B. Princeton, J.D. Stanford Law School, Member of the Bar of the State of New
York, Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602-11 (1982).
For discussion of a previous attempt by Senator Mathias to eliminate the act of state
doctrine through legislation, see Mathias, Restructuring The Act of State Doctrine: A
Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980).
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide extensive background information on
the FSIA. The statute has four major purposes: (i) to codify the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity; (ii) to place the determination of immunity questions squarely within the
judicial rather than the executive branch; (iii) to provide defined rules for service of process
upon foreign states; and (iv) to rectify inconsistencies existing between rules of immunity
from suit and from execution. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-8, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
The rule of jurisdictional immunity applicable to foreign states appears in § 1604 of the
FSIA which provides that subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States was a party at the time of the enactment of this Act in 1976, a foreign state is im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, unless one of the exceptions applies. In any
case where an exception does not apply, § 1330(a) and (b) gives federal district courts gen-
eral personal and subject matter jurisdiction against foreign states, which are defined as
including any political subdivision of a foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of the
foreign state. See § 1603(a).
The exceptions to immunity are found in §§ 1605-1607. Under § 1605, exceptions to
jurisdictional immunity are provided for in cases involving: (i) waivers of immunity; (ii)
commercial activity of foreign states having a specified jurisdictional nexus with the United
States; (iii) certain claims arising out of foreign expropriation; (iv) rights in property in the
U.S. acquired by successor or gifts or rights in immovable property in the United States; (v)
certain non-commercial tort claims; and (vi) certain claims in admiralty. Also, § 1607 pro-
vides an additional exception for counterclaims asserted in an action initiated in the United
States by a foreign state.
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by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in August,
1984.' The presumed purpose of bill S.1071 is to strengthen legal protec-
tions available to American business enterprises dealing with foreign gov-
ernments and their agencies and instrumentalities.3
While bill S.1071 contains a number of proposals for amendments to
the FSIA, this paper deals only with that amendment which affects the
act of state doctrine and which, as will be demonstrated below, greatly
restricts its applicability, and thereby undermines its basic rationale and
purpose.4 If enacted into law, this amendment will, in the opinion of the
authors, truly "vex the peace of nations," 5 and potentially endanger the
harmony of our relations with friendly foreign states. In order to properly
divine the intent and purpose of the proposed amendment, the history
and current application of the act of state doctrine must be examined.
II. THE ACT OF STATE DocTRINE
The classic formulation of the act of state doctrine was established
by the United States Supreme Court in a case dismissing a suit for
wrongful detention against the revolutionary government of Venezuela,
Underhill v. Hernandez. In Underhill the Court stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will hot sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers
For a general discussion of the statutory framework, see Carl, Suing Foreign Govern-
ments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Prac-
tice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979); De Laume, Long Arm Jurisdiction under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 640 (1980); Kahale & Vega, Immunity &
Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979); Browen, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act in Practice, 73 AM. J. INrT'L L. 200 (1979); Van Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Kane, Suing Foreign Sover-
eigns, a Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982).
2. Copies of the ABA proposals and ABA actions are available from the ABA Section
on International Law, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
3. S.1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S5363 (daily ed. May 3, 1985).
4. The proposals amend the FSIA in the following ways: (i) enhancing recognition of
arbitration awards against defaulting foreign states (§ 1605(a)(6)); (ii) permitting in rem
suits in admiralty against a ship rather than against the foreign government involved, as is
presently required (§ 1610); (iii) authorizing prejudgment attachment of commercial prop-
erty of a foreign state in certain situations (§ 1610); (iv) executing judgments against a
broader range of commercial property owned by the foreign state itself (Q 1610); and (v)
expanding the definition of commercial activity to include debt securities and other guaran-
ties of the foreign sovereign. (Q 1603(f)). For a further discussion of the proposed amend-
ments, see Atkeson & Ramsey, Proposed Amendment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 770 (1985). For a short comment agreeing with the authors' views on
act of state, see, A. Rubin, ABA Proposals to Amend the Foreign Immunities Act of 1976: A
Pointed Dissent, INrr'L PRAC. No'raooK 17 (Oct. 85).
5. See United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 876 (2d Cir. 1976).
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as between themselves.6
This is a simple and clear expression of the act of state doctrine, based
upon the principle of sovereign immunity from adjudication by United
States courts and the necessity of respecting the acts of foreign states
performed within their territory - all in the common interest of comity
and peaceful relations among nations.
In the seminal modern act of state case, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, which involved the expropriation of the property of a sugar
exporter within Cuba by the revolutionary Cuban government, the Su-
preme Court broadened the simple concept articulated in Underhill and
stated that
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the ab-
sence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding control-
ling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking vio-
lated customary international law.
7
Although the act of state doctrine is not mandated by the Constitu-
tion, the Sabbatino court found that it had "constitutional underpin-
nings."' The doctrine has its roots in the separation of powers between
the judicial and executive branches and the allocation by the Constitution
of the conduct of foreign affairs to the Executive. "The doctrine as formu-
lated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the judicial branch
that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts
of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the inter-
national sphere."9
The Supreme Court recognized that judicial interference in this sen-
sitive area might adversely affect relations between foreign sovereigns and
the United States. It might embarrass either the judicial or executive
branch or both, and it might impede the natural and beneficial develop-
ment of international law.10 The Court stated that, "its [act of state doc-
trine] continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper dis-
tribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.""
6. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
7. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
8. Id. at 423. ("The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitutional' underpin-
nings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of
separation of powers.")
9. Id. For the earlier decisions referred to, see Oetjen v. Central Leather, 246 U.S. 297,
302 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
10. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 433-34.
11. Id. at 427-28. For discussion of Sabbatino by the lawyer who represented the Cuban
government, see Rabinowitz, Viva Sabbatino, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 617 (1977). For the discus-
sion of the various aspects of the act of state doctrine, see Cooper, Act of State and Sover-
1986
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Essentially, the effect of Sabbatino was to graft onto the Underhill
formulation additional factors to be considered by American courts as to
the applicability of the act of state doctrine. The Underhill formulation
was simple and unqualified. The acts of a foreign state performed within
its territory were sacrosanct and totally immune from scrutiny by courts
of the United States.
Sabbatino, decided some forty years later, apparently rejected the
unconditional immunity of an internal act of state from judicial scrutiny
espoused in Underhill and propounded a separation of powers, i.e. "con-
stitutional underpinnings" basis for the doctrine. The application of the
act of state doctrine did not require "laying down or reaffirming an inflex-
ible and all-encompassing rule," but rather a balance of relevant consid-
erations, 2 and a careful case-by-case analysis of the extent to which the
separation of powers concerns on which the doctrine is based are impli-
cated by the action before the court."3
The act of state doctrine has been applied, since Sabbatino, to a vari-
ety of sovereign acts. Several cases involved nationalizations and expro-
priations. 4 In addition, United States courts have found that other sover-
eign Immunity: A Further Inquiry, 11 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 193 (1980); Golbert & Bradford,
The Act of State Doctrine: Dunhill and other Sabbatino Progeny, 9 SW. U. L. REv. (1977);
Gordon, The Origin and the Development of the Act of State Doctrine, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. J.
595 (1977); Kleinman, The Act of State Doctrine from Abstention to Activism, 6 J. CoMP.
Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 115 (1984); Lengel, The Duty of the Federal Courts to Apply Inter-
national Law. A Polemical Analysis of the Act of State Doctrine, 8 B.Y.U.L. REV. 61
(1982); Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political
Question Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722 (1983); Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration
of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 599 (1980); Note, Limiting the
Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1982); Note, Foreign
Expropriation Cases in the United States: Conflicting Legislation and Judicial Policies, 17
U.S.F.L. REV. 117 (1982); Kahale, Characterizing Nationalizations for Purposes of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act and Act of State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 392
(1982); Lindskog, Act of State or Act of Desperation, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 4 (Dec. 1982);
Mathias, Restructuring the Act of State Doctrine: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980); Zimmerman, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine Wisely:
The Viability of the Act of State Doctrine after the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18
TEx. INT'L L. J. 547 (1983); Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations:
Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327 (1982).
12. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
13. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316
n.38 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). For discussion of problems arising
out of the case by case analyses, see Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State
Doctrine and the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68
(1985); Note, The Resolution of Act of State Disputes Involving Indefinitely Situated
Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985).
14. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977)
(act of state doctrine rendered plaintiff's antitrust and contract claims against other Libyan
oil producers nonjusticiable); D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del.
1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (Mexican expro-
priation decree extinguishing corporation royalty and participation rights was valid act of
state); Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978),
aff'd, 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979) (nationalization of plaintiff's
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eign acts constitute unreviewable acts of state, including: denial of entry
and involuntary rerouting of a tourist's flight;' 5 extinguishing of a public
debt by statute; granting of authority to export offshore oil and gas re-
sources;" denial of a request to emigrate;" revocation of a license to ex-
port monkeys for research;' 9 denial of import license in order to control
foreign trade;20 and divesting of a former Director's authority to bring
suit on behalf of the corporation.2'
To illustrate application of the act of state doctrine, two contrasting
cases deserve mention.
In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,22 the Second Circuit, following the Sab-
batino Court's rationale of the act of state doctrine as a "judicial articula-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine,"'3 held that judicial inquiry
into the nationalization of oil concessions by the Libyan government in-
volved an examination of that government's motivations and was tanta-
mount to an examination of the validity of such an act. Accordingly, judi-
cial inquiry was foreclosed by the act of state doctrine.
In this case, plaintiff Hunt brought an action against defendant Mo-
bil Oil and other oil producers alleging violation of the antitrust laws and
breach of contract. The claim, which sought treble damages, asserted that
the defendants had combined and conspired to preserve the competitive
advantage of Persian Gulf crude oil over Libyan crude oil by preventing
Hunt from reaching a settlement with the Libyan government. Failure to
reach a settlement resulted in the nationalization of Hunt's Libyan
properties.
Although the government of Libya was not named as a co-conspirator
Libyan oil interests was a valid act of state).
15. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisor's Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980) (Domini-
can Republic immigration officials denial of entry to plaintiffs on vacation tour was fore-
closed by act of state doctrine).
16. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Grand Duchess of Saxony Weimar's claims for annuity payments from German government
were barred by act of state).
17. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (granting of an oil concession by governmental
officials of Umm Al Qaywayn entailed exercise of act of state).
18. Frolova v. USSR, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ill. 1983), affd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1985) (action against Soviet Union for refusal to allow plaintiff's husband to emigrate was
an act privileged under act of state doctrine).
19. MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Ore. 1983), afJ'd,
736 F.2d 1326, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984) (refusal of Bangladesh officials to renew
plaintiff's license to capture and export rhesus monkeys was act of state).
20. Van Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (de-
nial by Brazilian government of right to import farm type crop dusting plane was act of
state).
21. Tchacosh Co. Ltd. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 766 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1985) (Iranian
decrees divesting former managing director of Iranian corporation of authority to bring suit
on payment under subcontract was ruled act of state).
22. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
23. Id. at 77.
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nor designated as a defendant, the court held that Libya's excision from
the pleadings as a party did not eliminate a consideration of its actions.
The Department of State described the Libyan government's actions as a
political reprisal against the United States government and economic co-
ercion against United States nationals in Libya.2 4 Since the United States
government had officially characterized the motivation of the Libyan gov-
ernment, the court "would not make an inquiry into the subtle and delib-
erate issue of the policy of a Serbonian bog, precluded by the act of state
doctrine as well as the realities of the fact finding competence of the
court in an issue of far-reaching national concern". 25 The court held that
even if the Department of State had not spoken, inquiry as to the motiva-
tion of the Libyan government in nationalizing plaintiff's property was
foreclosed by the act of state doctrine.26
The Hunt decision can be contrasted with Rasoulzadeh v. The Asso-
ciated Press.2 7 In this case, an action was brought by Iranian nationals
against the Associated Press, which had leased a house from plaintiffs in
Iran, and thereafter allegedly breached the lease by permitting a Cana-
dian press group to occupy the house without plaintiff owners' consent.
Ultimately, the house was seized by the Iranian government since
Canadians were in disfavor as a result of assisting American diplomats to
escape to France. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted since the action was barred by the act
of state doctrine and alternatively, on the ground of forum non
conveniens.2
As to the act of state defense, the Court followed the case-by-case
approach set forth in Sabbatino, and refused to adopt an inflexible per se
application of the doctrine to determine the extent to which separation of
powers concerns were implicated. Balancing the relevant considerations
as required by Sabbatino," the Court refused to apply the act of state
doctrine primarily because, unlike the Hunt decision, "[r]esolution of
plaintiffs' claims will not require sitting in judgment on the acts of a for-
eign government. '30 The court, following the reasoning of the Second Cir-
cuit in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,'1
found that the application of the act of state doctrine posed no threat of
embarrassment to the executive branch in its conduct of foreign affairs
and would not require assessment of the legitimacy of the Iranian govern-
ment's actions.2
24. Id. at 73.
25. Id. at 77.
26. Id. at 78.
27. 574 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) af/'d without opinion, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985).
28. The Court held forum non conveniens did not warrant dismissal of the action as
the availability of an alternate forum was not demonstrated. Id. at 860-61.
29. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
30. Rasoulzadeh, 574 F. Supp. at 860.
31. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
32. Rasoulzadeh, 574 F. Supp. at 860. The court found that the "executive branch has
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Thus at this point in judicial history, the apparently inflexible act of
state doctrine established in Underhill has been qualified by the balanc-
ing case-by-case formulation articulated in Sabbatino. Therefore, where
circumstances require an inquiry into the motivation of a foreign govern-
ment, further inquiry must be made as to whether such an inquiry or an
adjudication as to a foreign sovereign's act would result in embarrassment
to the executive branch. While this articulation of the act of state doc-
trine would seem a reasonable compromise, the Hunt and -Rasoulzadeh
decisions show that this formulation nevertheless encompasses the danger
of differences of judicial opinion as to the degree of embarrassment to the
executive branch. Consequently, confusing and contradictory judicial pro-
nouncements have been made by various courts, which in and of them-
selves may cause embarrassment to the executive branch.3" In the view of
the authors, the FSIA amendments will not rectify these problems in ap-
plying the doctrine.
A. The Hickenlooper Amendment
The Sabbatino decision prompted an almost immediate reaction to
modify the application of the act of state doctrine. In 1965, soon after
Sabbatino was decided, United States Senator Hickenlooper proposed an
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Hickenlooper
Amendment requires United States courts to adjudicate any question in-
volving "a claim of title or other right to property . . . based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation . . . by an act of that state in violation of
the principles of international law."'
Although the Hickenlooper Amendment was "intended to reverse in
part" the Sabbatino decision,3 5 it has only been applied in a few cases,
no interest in a tort claim by Iranian citizens against an American corporation arising out of
the latter's breach of a lease agreement, the use of plaintiff's Iranian property by Canadians,
and the subsequent confiscation of the property by Iran.. . . Iran's confiscation of plain-
tiff's property [cannot] fairly be compared to that 'integral governmental function' in Hunt
which formed a part of a 'continued and broadened confrontation between East and West.'"
Id.
33. "The importance of a unified national voice on foreign policy has been recognized
since the founding of the republic." Hunt, 550 F.2d at 78 n.12. In the OPEC decision, the
court stated that: "To participate adeptly in the global community, the United States must
speak with one voice and pursue a careful and deliberate foreign policy. . . . When the
courts engage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of sovereign acts of states, they risk
disruption of our country's international diplomacy. The executive may utilize protocol, eco-
nomic sanction, compromise, delay, and persuasion to achieve international objectives. Ill-
timed judicial decisions challenging the acts of foreign states could nullify those tools and
embarrass the United States in the eyes of the world." International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
35. S. REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3829, 3852.
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such as Sabbatino on remand. 6 The Hickenlooper Amendment has been
held not to apply unless the confiscated property has been brought into
the United States.3 7 It has not applied to the taking of property of non-
United States citizens."8 It has also been held inapplicable to cases involv-
ing contract rights."9
In addition to the Hickenlooper Amendment, which is a legislative
attempt to restrict application of the act of state doctrine, courts have
developed additional "exceptions" to the act of state doctrine. This arti-
cle will now briefly discuss the so-called commercial activity and extrater-
ritorial exceptions, both of which will be impacted by the proposed FSIA
amendments.
B. Commercial Activity Exception
The plurality opinion of the Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,4 0 has been interpreted as creating an
exception to the act of state doctrine when the act of a foreign sovereign
is "commercial". In Dunhill, the Cuban revolutionary government "inter-
36. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1968).
37. Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983) (Act of state doctrine precluded consideration of a
tort claim brought by a Mexican natural gas purchaser against American natural gas ex-
porter. Hickenlooper exception was inapplicable where neither the nationalized property of
plaintiff nor its proceeds were located in the United States). See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
First National City Bank of New York, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
406 U.S. 759 (1972).
38. Compania, 686 F.2d at 327.
39. See Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Services Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461
(W.D. La. 1975) (Hickenlooper exception was not applicable to a claim for breach of con-
tract in case where plaintiffs sought to recover crude oil seized on board three tankers in
area where offshore concession agreements had been granted by the adjacent sheikdoms);
Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 992 (1979); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
This article will not discuss two other purported exceptions to the Act of State doctrine.
One is the "Bernstein exception," supported by three justices in First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba [hereinafter cited as Bancec], 406 U.S. 759 (1972). This exception,
which has never been applied in an actual case, states that the judiciary can refuse to give
recognition to an act of state if the executive branch so advises. Id. at 764. See Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansch, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) for further discussion of the
exception. See also McCormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign
Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 500-502 (1984).
The plurality opinion in Bancec also articulated a "counterclaim exception," stating
that a foreign state plaintiff cannot raise act of state as a defense to a defendant's counter-
claim up to the amount of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 768-69; See Alberti v. Empresa Ni-
caraguense de Came, 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983) for discussion of the limited nature of
exception, which was held not applicable there. For further commentary on exceptions, see
Conant, The Act of State Doctrine & Its Exceptions: An Introduction, 12 VAND. TRANS-
NAT'L J. L. 259 (1979).
40. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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vened", i.e. nationalized the business and assets of five leading cigar man-
ufacturers. The Intervention Decree did not by its terms repudiate any
debt or outstanding obligations of the supplier. It merely designated the
"interventors" who were directed to operate the business. The former
owners of the manufacturing companies brought an action against Dun-
hill and other importers for the purchase price of cigars that had been
shipped to them prior to the intervention. Dunhill had mistakenly paid
the interventors for these pre-intervention shipments. In due course, the
interventors refused to return these funds to Dunhill.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that there was
nothing in the record of the case revealing an act of state with respect to
the interventors obligation to return the sums mistakenly paid to them.4 1
The interventors refusal to repay the mistakenly paid funds did not con-
stitute an act of state since no statute, decree, order, or resolution of the
Cuban government was offered into evidence indicating Cuban repudia-
tion of its obligations.4 2
The plurality opinion stated that even if Cuba's repudiation of its
obligation was an act of state, it would not be shielded from judicial scru-
tiny. The doctrine did not apply to "repudiation of a purely commercial
obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial
instrumentalities. 43
In the opinion of the authors, a commercial activity exception to the
act of state doctrine as enunciated in the plurality opinion does not and
should not exist. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of an "act of state" that is
"commercial" in nature, since by hypothesis, it is a governmental act per-
formed in the exercise of governmental authority. Of course such an act
may involve commercial transactions, as for example, the repudiation of
an existing contractual obligation - for which there would appear to be
no defense of sovereign immunity under Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. 4'
But that is not the Dunhill case. Dunhill illustrates that there seems to
be some confusion between interpretation of the FSIA and the act of
state doctrine as to a foreign government's commercial activity. The FSIA
codifies the so-called restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,45 which
does not permit a court to take subject matter or personal jurisdiction
over a foreign state (as therein defined), unless such foreign state falls
41. Id. at 690.
42. Id. at 695.
43. Id.
44. See McCormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nity and the Act of State Doctrine, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477 (1984); Note, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Conflict Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1441 (1983); Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Direct Effects and Mini-
mum Contacts, 14 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 97 (1981); Note, Effects Jurisdiction under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 474 (1980);
Note, Direct Effect Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 INT'L L.
& POL'Y 571 (1981); and supra note 1.
45. See supra note 1, HousE REPORT at 7, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6605.
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within one of the exceptions provided for, one of which is the commercial
activity exception. 46 The theory appears to be that if a foreign state en-
ters the marketplace it must be treated for all purposes as any other
merchant with respect to jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a foreign state performing an act under govern-
mental authority within its territory has not entered the commercial mar-
ketplace, and thus the restrictive theory of immunity has no application
in such a case. Whereas the FSIA is concerned with jurisdiction, the act
of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional doctrine,47 but a doctrine, assum-
ing jurisdiction, which precludes our courts from the adjudication of the
acts of foreign governments performed within their territory.
C. Extraterritorial Exception
Since the Underhill decision, the act of state doctrine requires that
the act of the foreign sovereign in question must have been "done within
its own territory. '48 If the foreign sovereign's act is not "done" (i.e. un-
dertaken and completed entirely within its territorial boundaries), the act
of state doctrine simply has no application.49 Where the act of the foreign
sovereign, by its terms, directly affects or impacts upon property located
outside of its jurisdiction, other established legal principles come into
play, e.g., the extent to which courts of the United States will recognize or
give extraterritorial effect to the decrees of a foreign state. The applicable
legal principle is that for reasons of comity, such foreign decrees will be
recognized and given effect by our courts provided the decrees are not
contrary to the laws and public policy of the United States.50 Thus in the
opinion of the authors, there is no extraterritorial exception.
It is interesting to note, however, the extent to which some United
States courts have avoided the doctrine's application by embroidering
upon the requirement that the act of state must have been performed
within the territory of the foreign sovereign. For example, Libra Bank
Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica,5" involved the refusal to pay debts
46. See supra note 1, for discussion of other exceptions.
47. Some courts and commentators have forgotten that "[w]hile the effect of sovereign
immunity is to shield the person of the foreign sovereign, and, by extension, his agents from
jurisdiction, the act of state doctrine shields the foreign sovereign's internal laws from intru-
sive scrutiny." Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 762
F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
48. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
49. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) ("principle of judicial refusal of examination applies only
to a taking by a foreign sovereign within its own territory").
50. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 43 (1965); see Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 51 (U.S.
courts will give effect to acts of state only if consistent with the policy and law of the U.S.).
See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 908 (2d Cir. 1981);
United Bank 542 F.2d at 872.
51. 570 F. Supp. 870, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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incurred by the government-owned Banco Nacional of Costa Rica, be-
cause of currency decrees enacted by that government. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York adopted the formu-
lation of the Second Circuit articulated in Menendez v. Saks, 52 that for
"purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not 'located' within a
foreign state unless that state has the power to enforce or collect it ...
[Tihe power to enforce payment of a debt . . . generally depends on ju-
risdiction over the person of the debtor." The general rule in most con-
texts is that the situs of a debt is the domicile of the debtor. 3
Since the credit instruments expressly stated that they were payable
in New York, Judge Motley rejected the act of state defense and held
that the property "confiscated" by the government of Costa Rica was
"plaintiffs' legal right to repayment of the debt owed by the defendant"
in New York.5" In a similar case, Allied Bank International v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago,55 the Second Circuit held that no act of
state was involved because the situs of the debt was New York, not Costa
52. 485 F.2d 1355, 1364-65 (2d Cir. 1973).
53. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For
discussion of debt situs issues, see Note, Debt Situs and the Act of State Doctrine: a Propo-
sal for a More Flexible Standard, 49 ALB. L. REV. 647 (1985); Note, The Resolution of Act
of State Disputes Involving Indefinitely Situated Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 901 (1985).
54. Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 878. The district court ignored the Hickenlooper re-
quirement that a confiscation or taking in violation of international law must be tangible,
not intangible property such as contract rights. The district court also made the extraordi-
nary statement: "[In a strict legal sense all property is intangible." Id. See infra notes 58
and 59 for authority that the enactment of exchange controls is not a "taking" or
"confiscation."
Another interesting example of act of state embroidery relating to the so-called "territo-
rial limitation" was the articulation of the Second Circuit in United Bank, 542 F.2d at 874,
relying on the Fifth Circuit decision in Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar
Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968), to the effect that
where an act of state has not "come to complete fruition within the dominion of [a foreign]
government .... no fait accompli has occurred." Consequently, the inability of a foreign
state to complete an expropriation within its territorial borders reduces the foreign state's
expectations of dominion over the property in question. The foreign state is less likely to be
vexed by a judicial disposition of the property. United Bank, 542 F.2d at 875. This formula-
tion is apparently an attempt to explain the underlying rationale of the territorial limitation
of the act of state doctrine. See also Tchacosh Co. Ltd. 766 F.2d 1333, in which the court
affirmed that Iranian decrees divesting former managing director of Iranian corporation of
authority to bring suit on payment under a subcontract for construction of certain defense
facilities in Iran was an act of State. At the time of divestment, general contractor held no
property or assets of Iranian corporation within U.S. territory. Therefore Iran was in a posi-
tion to perform a fait accompli over the acquisition of any money owed Tchacosh by
Rockwell. Id. at 1338.
55. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (Sept. 20, 1985). This
decision was a rehearing and overturned an earlier Second Circuit Allied decision which
implicitly rejected Libra and held Costa Rica's debt rescheduling was consistent with princi-
ples of "comity", and thereby consistent with the law and policy of the United States. 733
F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984). For a discussion of this latter case, see Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning
(or Losing) By Default: The Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in
International Business Transactions, 19 INr'L Bus. TRANS. 225 (1985).
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Rica.
D. Recent Applications
There have been some recent cases demonstrating the present vital-
ity and vigor of the act of state doctrine and recognizing its basic purpose
and rationale. In the opinion of the authors, the FSIA amendments will
severely affect the application of the doctrine in these cases.
In Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C.,"6 plaintiffs were a number of United
States citizens who purchased peso and dollar denominated certificates of
deposit in 1981 from Bancomer, S.A., at the time, a privately owned bank.
In 1982, in response to an economic crisis, the Mexican government na-
tionalized the entire private banking system and issued exchange controls
which decreed that all bank deposits must be repaid upon maturity in the
national currency. As a result of these decrees, plaintiffs received pesos at
the prescribed exchange rate of 70-80 pesos per dollar, instead of the then
free market rate of 135-50 pesos per dollar.5 7 Plaintiffs filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for
breach of contract in the amount of $900,000 as well as violations of the
federal securities laws. Bancomer moved to dismiss the complaint, argu-
ing that the court lacked jurisdiction under the FSIA, and that even if
jurisdiction did exist, the act of state doctrine precluded examination of
Mexico's acts. The district court held that jurisdiction existed under the
FSIA, but dismissed the suit under the act of state doctrine.58 The plain-
tiffs appealed.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the issu-
ance of certificates of deposit was a commercial activity under Section
1605(a)(2) of the FSIA.5 But the absence of immunity did not make
plaintiffs' claims justiciable. Utilizing the situs analyses found in Libra
and Allied discussed above, the court determined that because the situs
of the plaintiffs' certificates was in Mexico, the act of state doctrine pre-
vented judicial examination of the complaint. The court held that Mex-
ico's enactment of exchange controls was not commercial activity, but
sovereign governmental activity since only a sovereign could enact ex-
change controls. 60 "[T]he mechanisms used by Mexico were conventional
devices of civilized nations faced with severe monetary crises."61 The
56. 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
57. For further discussion of the Mexican economic crisis, see Zamora, Peso-Dollar Ec-
onomics and the Imposition of Foreign Exchange Controls in Mexico, 32 Am. J. COMPL. 99
(1984); Morgan, Legal Issues Arising from the Mexican Economic Crisis, 17 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (1984); Gomez-Palacio, Mexico's Foreign Exchange Controls, Two Ad-
ministrations, Two Solutions, Thorough and Benign, 16 U. IAMI INT. AM. L. REv. 267
(1984).
58. Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d
222 (2d Cir. 1985).
59. Braka, 762 F.2d 222.
60. Id. at 225-26.
61. Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1472.
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Braka court refused to recognize the so-called commercial activity excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine enunciated in Dunhill, since the relevant
acts taken "for the purpose of saving its national economy from the brink
of monetary disaster, surely represents the exercise [of] powers peculiar
to sovereigns. 62
Eight other courts including two courts of appeal have also held,
based on similar facts, that the important governmental act, imposition of
exchange controls and regulation of the Mexican economy, mandated dis-
missal under the act of state doctrine.2 Other courts have also held that
the same sovereign act (i.e. refusal by a foreign government to pay an
alleged debt owed in U.S. dollars based upon the urgent need to preserve
scarce foreign exchange), is an unreviewable act of state. 4
After having discussed the relevant historic background and excep-
tions to the act of state doctrine, it is now possible to focus on the impact
that the proposed legislation would have on the doctrine.
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The relevant proposed new Section 1606(b) of the FSIA provides as
follows:
The Federal act of state doctrine shall not be applied on behalf of a
foreign state with respect to any claim or counterclaim asserted pur-
suant to the provisions of this chapter which is based upon an expro-
priation or other taking of property, including contract rights, without
the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation or oth-
erwise in violation of international law or which is based upon a
breach of contract, nor shall such doctrine bar enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate or an arbitral award rendered against a foreign
state.
62. Braka, 762 F.2d at 225 (quoting Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704 (plurality opinion)). Plain-
tiffs can always seek their remedies in the courts of Mexico or via diplomatic claims, arbitra-
tion or treaty, not in the application of one state's version of international law to another
state.
63. Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Frankel v. Banco Nacional de
Mexico, No. 82, Civ. 6457 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983), appeal dismissed, No. 83-7543 (2d Cir.
July 12, 1983); Offshore Express v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1983 at 6,
col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); Braka v. Nacional Financiera, No. 83 Civ. 4161 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,
1984). Sanger v. Bancomer, No. 84-1223 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1984); Reidel v. Bancomer, SA,
No. C84-219-A (N.D. Ohio Sept 28, 1984), appeal filed, No. 85-3517 (6th Cir. 1985); West v.
Multibanco Comermex, SA, No. 83-0174 (N.D. Ca. May 23, 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-2162
(9th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Multibanco Comermex, SA, 589 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). (All
cases filed by American plaintiffs who lost the dollar value of their deposits in Mexican
banks after the 1982 exchange controls were implemented).
64. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 55, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 442, 242
N.E.2d 704, 711 (1968) ("[Tjhe currency regulations of a foreign state ... are not appropri-
ate subjects for evaluation by state courts applying local conceptions of public policy.");
DeSanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, No. 79-4281 (E.D. La. Mar. 9, 1984), aff'd on
other grounds, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
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What is this proposed amendment designed to accomplish? Since the
amendment appears to restrict the application of the act of state doc-
trine, it follows that the intent of the amendment is to improve the reme-
dies available to United States nationals, both individuals and enter-
prises, against foreign states. Clearly, restrictive application or total
elimination of the doctrine would improve such remedies. But it would
seem that the availability of unlimited remedies against foreign states in
our courts would certainly "vex the peace of nations" and prove highly
prejudicial to our foreign relations with friendly countries. Moreover, un-
limited remedies might result in judgments that would not be enforced in
other jurisdictions. The question then becomes, to what degree can the
application of the act of state doctrine be restricted without undermining
the United States in the conduct of its international relations?
It is submitted by the authors that the direct intention and purpose
of the proposed amendment is to reverse the Braka decision and the
other recently decided cases cited above, relating to the imposition of
Mexican exchange controls and the resultant non-payment of United
States dollar certificates of deposit.6 5 Assuming that the language of the
proposed amendment inhibits the application of the act of state doctrine
in such cases, can anyone conceive of a more "vexing" result than a for-
eign state found subject to the judgment of a United States court requir-
ing it to pay obligations, the payment of which is prohibited by its own
laws? In the Mexican banking cases discussed above, Mexican law prohib-
ited the payment in dollars of plaintiffs' accounts. Furthermore, by refus-
ing to obey the United States judgment, that foreign state then becomes
subject to possible orders of attachment or execution on its property lo-
cated in the United States." This might well lead to significant and se-
vere economic problems for the foreign state.
7
In this connection, note the casual statement of Judge Motley in Li-
bra Bank:
The court is not unmindful that the effect of its judgment is to
reverse the Costa Rican decrees. The court believes, however, that in
this situation, because its judgment is unlikely to "vex the peace of
nations" . . . there is less need for judicial deference to the foreign
affairs competence of the other branches of government.6 8
Other courts have disagreed with the statement of Judge Motley. Re-
65. The part of the amendment dealing with the recognition of arbitral agreements or
awards is clearly designed to reverse the case of Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem., 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognition or
enforcement of arbitration award granted to United States oil company declined based on
act of state doctrine).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
67. A discussion of problems of lenders is beyond the scope of this article. See Allied
Bank, 757 F.2d 516 and articles discussing the Allied decision.
68. 570 F. Supp. at 882.
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cently, in Callejo v. Bancomer,9 the Fifth Circuit rejected any commer-
cial activity exception to the act of state doctrine and stated: "[W]hile we
are doubtful of our ability to foresee what will vex the peace of nations,
we have no doubt that disregarding the Mexican regulations would be
very vexing indeed." 70 Hence, as this article has shown, the acts of a for-
eign state have been treated differently in various United States jurisdic-
tions, with easily imagined negative consequences for our international
relations.
Regrettably, the drafters of new Section 1606(b) of the FSIA have
created confusion and doubt by not defining the scope and applications of
the amendment with appropriate clarity. There are numerous examples.
There are several instances of undefined and imprecise use of lan-
guage. First, since the amendment provides that the doctrine shall not be
applied "on behalf of a foreign state" as to certain claims, there would
appear to be no prohibition to the application of the doctrine in cases
involving only private parties. Thus, a private party could assert an act of
state defense involving a contract right or breach of contract, but the for-
eign state could not. It would be hard to justify such an inconsistent re-
sult. For example, in the Hunt case, the defendant Mobil could assert an
act of state defense on its own behalf.7 1 But if the Libyan government
became a party, it could not assert the defense.
Second, as further evidence of the unclear use of language in the pro-
posed amendment, it appears only to cover claims or counterclaims
"based upon" direct acts of a foreign sovereign, which constitute expro-
priation or breach of contract in violation of international law. What
about situations where the act of state, while relevant, is only indirectly
implicated in the claim, such as in the Hunt and Rasoulzadeh cases?
Third, the term "breach of contract" does, in the opinion of the au-
thors, require some elucidation. To what exactly, does any claim "based
upon a breach of contract" refer? Is this limited to a voluntary repudia-
tion by a foreign government of a contractual obligation? Must the con-
tract be part of a commercial transaction? Does this refer only to an iso-
lated international transaction? What about the total repudiation of
obligations payable in a foreign currency resulting in a breach of con-
tract? What about a claim based on breach of contract between private
parties where the breach is the result of a nationally mandated sovereign
fiscal policy such as the imposition of exchange controls? In this latter
situation can it be argued that there has been no breach since the con-
tract has been "reformed" by operation of law, rendering it legal and en-
forceable in the foreign jurisdiction?
Assuming that the thrust of the proposed amendment is to deal with
exchange controls and similar fiscal enactments by a foreign state, a con-
69. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
70. Id., at 1116.
71. See Hunt, 550 F.2d 68 cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984.
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flict arises with foreign policy objectives since the United States is a party
to the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement creating the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF).7 2 The United States supports and promotes the policies
of the IMF which has mandated that third world countries establish ex-
change controls and devalue national currencies in order to be eligible for
international bank loans. A conflict may arise for U.S. foreign policy in-
terests if the third world country complies with U.S.-backed IMF-im-
posed controls, which may cause that country to default on individual
obligations to private U.S. lenders.
Fourth, the amendment purports to extend the application of the
Hickenlooper Amendment to the expropriation or taking of intangible
property (i.e. contract rights, in violation of international law). Assuming
the amendment is directed to situations similar to those involved in Libra
and in the Mexican exchange control cases, it fails to recognize that the
imposition of exchange controls such as those imposed by Costa Rica and
Mexico, have been expressly held not to be an "expropriation" or "tak-
ing. ' 7 - Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that United States prop-
erty is not "taken", as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, by the enactment of legal tender and currency legislation by
the United States.7 4
Fifth, if we return to the words of the Sabbatino case concerning
expropriation:
Communist countries, although they have in fact provided a de-
gree of compensation after diplomatic efforts, commonly recognize no
obligation on the part of the taking country. Certain representatives
of the newly independent and underdeveloped countries have ques-
tioned whether rules of state responsibility toward aliens can bind na-
tions which have not consented to them and it is argued that the tra-
ditionally articulated standards governing expropriation of property
reflect 'imperialist' interests that are inappropriate to the circum-
stances of emergent states .
The disagreement as to relevant international law standards re-
flects an ever more basic divergence between the national interests of
capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the social
ideologies of those countries that favor state control of a considerable
portion of the means of production and those that adhere to a free
enterprise system. It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country
embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively
the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the com-
72. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended, effective
April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. no. 8937.
73. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 55, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 442, 242
N.E.2d 704, 710 (1968); F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY, 473-74 (4th ed. 1982).
74. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (17 Wall.) 457 (1871) (Legal Tender cases); Norman v. Balti-
more & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (Gold Clause Cases).
75. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429-430. (statement of Mr. Padilla Nervo (Mexico)).
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munity of nations. 78
[I]t rests upon the sanguine presupposition that the decisions of
the courts of the world's major capital exporting country and principal
exponent of the free enterprise system would be accepted as disinter-
ested expressions of sound legal principle by those adhering to widely
different ideologies. 77
Thus, if under the new legislation United States courts revoke the
use of the act of state doctrine in the major areas in which it is used, it
will likely give great offense to the expropriating or breaching nations. It
could result in retaliation on an economic or political level by that state.
"Terrorist" actions against United States businesses, military, and civil-
ians may increase "since the concept of territorial sovereignty is so deep
seated, any state may resent the refusal of the courts of another sovereign
to accord validity to acts within its territorial borders.
7 8
The United States Department of State has had reservations about
the type of legislation represented by the proposed amendments. Con-
cerning a similar Congressional bill, former Legal Adviser of the State
Department, Davis Robinson, has stated, "[F]riction with foreign govern-
ments occurs with some frequency over alleged conflicts of jurisdiction
and with regard to enforcement actions perceived to be inappropriate ex-
traterritorial exercises of jurisdiction by the United States. Such contro-
versies may be isolated events in our relations with particular countries.
Or they may involve long-term and deep-rooted differences, sometimes
with close friends and allies. 7 9
Mr. Robinson recently expressed concern about the implications of
S.1071. "What if the shoe were on the other foot?" Would the U.S. Gov-
ernment and its agencies resist in a case if comparable rules were applied
in a foreign jurisdiction? Secondly, diplomatic relations could be ad-
versely affected, and there may be an increase in nonappearances and de-
fault judgments in the U.S. courts by foreign sovereigns."' This may be
followed by attempts in the United States to then undo the damage to
foreign relations wrought by judicial decisions rendered without the bene-
fit of adversary proceedings.8 "
76. Id. at 430.
77. Id. at 434-35.
78. Id. at 432.
79. ACT OF STATE & EXTRATERRITORiAL REACH 57 (J. Lacey ed. 1983) (remarks by
Robinson in reference to S.1434, an unadopted bill limiting the act of state doctrine).
80. Summary of Remarks made at ABA Annual Convention Presidential Showcase:
Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, July 10, 1985, attended by author
Wing.
81. An actual example of judicial interference with foreign policy objectives occurred in
Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982). The United
States Department of Justice advised the federal district court that failure to set aside a
default judgment against the Government of China for the value of bearer bonds issued by
the Imperial Chinese government in 1911, would exacerbate international tensions and harm
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Mr. Robinson can probably answer his own questions since he was
still Legal Adviser when the United States decided to withdraw from fur-
ther proceedings on the merits after an unfavorable jurisdictional decision
by the 16 member International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. 2
If the United States Government was not willing to accede to the jurisdic-
tion at the at least arguably impartial Hague, would it be willing to ac-
cede to the jurisdiction of the state courts of Nicaragua, which are gov-
erned by socialist and civil code principles concerning international law?
Imagine a suit brought against the United States by Nicaraguan private
businessmen for interference with the Nicaraguan domestic economy as a
result of the United States-imposed blockade. Would the United States
permit prejudgment attachment of United States government assets or
execution of a default judgment by the Nicaraguans? If not, would it ac-
cept nationalization or expropriation of one of the many United States
owned private companies when Nicaragua desired to collect the default
judgment? If suit was brought in Libya, would the United States govern-
ment submit to jurisdiction or abide by the judgment?
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposed amendments affecting the act of state doctrine ignore
the interdependent nature of the world economy. "We live in a world that
daily grows more interdependent. In 1970, international trade accounted
for only 6 percent of the United States' gross national product. Today, it
is over 12 percent. 8 3 We live in a country with a trade deficit of over
$123 billion."
Therefore, it is more important than ever before that in order to en-
courage our export efforts, we acknowledge and be cognizant of the differ-
ent economic and political systems that characterize our current and po-
tential major trading partners. In order to peaceably co-exist with our
fellow humanity, it is important to respect diversity. The amendment re-
lating to the act of state doctrine is ambiguous and could cause major
political, diplomatic, and economic repercussions with other foreign
states. It should be abandoned. The act of state doctrine remains a posi-
tive and vitally important doctrine which should not be eliminated
through the "back door" of the FSIA. It remains a viable and important
doctrine as we head toward the year 2000.
bilateral relations with China. Nevertheless the court retained its jurisdiction, but later dis-
missed the bondholders' claim on the ground that the FSIA did not apply to transactions
predating the statute's existence. 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
82. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicr. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26), 24 I.L.M. 59 (1985).
83. 131 CONG. REc. S5370 (daily ed. May 3, 1985) (statement by Mr. Mathias).
84. Id.
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